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Abstract:  
In a first for South Africa, we draw on literature on infrastructure productivity to model 
dynamic economywide employment impacts of infrastructure investment funded with 
different fiscal tools. According to the South African investment plan, the policy will affect 
the stock of infrastructure as well as the stock of capital of some private and public 
sectors. Increased government deficit financed infrastructure spending improves GDP 
and reduces unemployment. However, in the long term, the policy reduces investment 
and it is not sustainable for South Africa to let its deficit grow unabated. Increased 
investment spending financed by tax increases has contrasting implications on 
unemployment. In the long run, unemployment decreases for all types of workers under 
one of the scenarios. In the short run, only elementary occupation workers benefit from a 
decrease in unemployment; for the rest, unemployment rises. Findings have immediate 
policy implications in various policy modelling areas. 
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1 Introduction 
The literature on the causes of economic growth5 presents evidence that infrastructure and capital 
formation are important determinants of economic growth and rising per capita incomes over 
time. This is a lesson that has been well learned and applied in Asian economies over the last 
several decades where large public investments have contributed to high economic growth.  
According to Estache (2007), infrastructure seems to be returning to the agenda of development 
economists. In South Africa, investment in infrastructure in the years preceding democracy was 
in general very low. During the era of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) from 
1996 to 2002, public infrastructure investment fell from 8.1% to 2.6% of gross domestic product 
(GDP). The emphasis during that time was fiscal discipline more than expenditure increase. It 
was from the Accelerated and Shared Growth for South Africa (AsgiSA) plan in 2002 that a 
drive for infrastructure was couched explicitly in policy. Today, the main pillars of government 
economic policy, the New Growth Path (NGP), the Industrial Policy Action Plan and the 
National Development Plan (NDP), are anchored in a significant ramping up of current and 
capital expenditure by the state. The government and state-owned companies plan to spend about 
R845bn on infrastructure over the next three years, which they expect will contribute 
significantly to meeting the government job-creation target of 5-million jobs in 2020 (NGP) or 
11 million jobs by 2030 (NDP). So much is riding on this state infrastructure spending as the 
solution to reducing poverty, inequality and unemployment and generating economic growth.  
 
The question whether there are economic gains from the provision of higher levels of public 
spending on capital is fundamental6. If a higher level of capital raises the growth path of the 
economy then it is justifiable on both equity and efficiency grounds. Whilst no one will argue 
about the equity issues involved, some will no doubt argue that additional public spending can 
create efficiency costs. There are a number of possible reasons for this. Firstly, whilst public 
capital is usually productive, this is by no means the consensus view empirically, and the 
literature contains a wide variety of estimates of the size of the marginal product of public capital 
ranging from positive to negative. Even if it is assumed that the marginal product of additional 
public spending is positive, critics might presumably ask further questions. First, is the effect of 
such spending permanent or temporary, and if temporary, of what magnitude and after what 
period of time can one expect positive effects? Government spending on public sector capital 
may have positive multiplier effects and may, therefore, raise economic activity and thus 
economic growth. However, once installed will these effects drop to zero? The answer here is 
not clear. In a Solow - type growth model the effects on growth would be expected to be 
transitory, positive initially, but zero in the new steady state with a higher level of output. But if 
public capital raises education and innovation, which might be expected in South Africa, the 
                                                 
5See Aghion and Howitt (2000). 
6 For a detailed discussion of relevant papers in this field see Aghion and Howit (2000). 
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effects could be permanent and indeed much of the gains could come from spillover effects 
raising the productivity of private sector capital and labour. Secondly, critics of public spending 
would presumably argue that even if public capital has a positive effect, its magnitude would 
need to be compared to the productivity of private sector capital, if inefficient public capital 
spending is crowding out efficient private sector capital the effects on the economy could be 
negative. Thirdly, consideration would have to be given to how the public spending is financed.  
Raising taxes or borrowing could both have negative effects on economic activity which might 
offset the gains of public sector capital spending.  
 
This paper reflects on the current state and likely future of South African infrastructure 
investment policy, focusing specifically on government infrastructure spending and how 
alternative financing arrangements will affect employment, both in the short and longer-term. 
For these purposes, a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with 
elaborate labour market disaggregation, government budget constraints and alternative funding 
options for infrastructure scale up is used. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 reviews the literature to situate the study, followed by a presentation of the model and data in 
section 3. Section 4 presents the simulations and implications of introducing alternative 
infrastructure investment in such a framework. We close the paper with concluding remarks and 
policy recommendations in section 5. 
 
2 Literature Review 
(Neo) classical economics generally assumes that activist fiscal policy is unnecessary to increase 
employment and production. Government expenditure is generally believed to be consumptive 
and leading to crowd out of private investment if financed with public debt. Wagner’s law 
assumes that public expenditure is endogenous and hence cannot be used as a policy lever. 
Politicians at best should pursue balanced budget strategies. Keynesian economists on the other 
hand believe that public expenditure is important in determining the level of income as well as its 
distribution. The market mechanism would not be sufficient to restore full employment. There is 
a substantial body of empirical literature related to the public expenditure-economic growth 
nexus (see Moreno-Dodson (2009) for a review of government spending and economic growth 
studies). An important strand of the literature of direct relevance for this study is the idea that the 
composition of public expenditures (capital versus current) can have differential impacts on 
economic growth. 
 
There is an extensive literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the effects of public capital 
spending on output dating back to Arrow and Kurz (1970) and Aschauer (1989). During the 
1980s and 1990s, there was strong academic interest (particularly in the United States of 
America), on the link between public investment in infrastructure and economic growth. From 
the outset, it is interesting to note the trend in which this research has followed, from the initial 
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headline estimates of a production elasticity of 0.4 in 1989 to the more modest assessments of 
0.1 in 1997. The link between infrastructure investment and economic growth has been a major 
topic for academics since the publication of Aschauer (1989)’s seminal paper which found that 
public investment in infrastructure was a very important source of economic growth. Aschauer 
(1989) considered the relationship between aggregate output and the stock and flow of 
government spending variables and concluded that ‘core’ infrastructure of streets, highways, 
airports and mass transit systems should be given more weight when assessing the role 
government plays in the promotion of economic growth and productivity improvements. 
Aschauer (1989)’s work suggested that the elasticity of output with respect to government capital 
was highly positive, within a range of 0.38 to 0.56. This implies extremely high returns, with the 
marginal product of government capital in the region of 100 per cent per annum or more. This 
would imply that one unit of Government capital pays for itself in terms of higher output in a 
year or less. Given these results, it’s not surprising that Aschauer (1989)’s work was to initiate 
the ‘public infrastructure debate’ which has resulted in numerous academic studies since. 
 
Munnell (1992) provides an excellent assessment of the early literature on the public 
infrastructure debate. She shows that the main problem with Aschauer (1989)’s work is that his 
results do not rule out the possibility that the direction of causality runs from growth to 
infrastructure (i.e. economic growth might lead to an increase in the need for investment and/or 
an increase in the availability of funding), or that the correlations that he found are spurious. 
Nevertheless, in response to the critics who claim that the wide range of estimates of public 
capital’s impact on output ‘make the empirical linkages fragile’, Munnell (1992) provides 
evidence to suggest these claims are misleading. As illustrated in Table 1 below, in almost all 
cases the impact of public capital on private output has been found to be positive and statistically 
significant.  
 
Table 1: The impact of an increase in the stock of public capital on output 
Author Focus of study Output elasticity of 
public capital 
Aschauer (1989) US National 0.39 
Holz-Eakin (1988) US National 0.39 
Munnell (1990a) US National 0.34 
Costa, Ellson and Martin (1987) US States 0.20 
Eisener (1991) US States 0.17 
Mera (1973) Japanese regions 0.20 
Munnell (1990b) US States 0.15 
Duffy-Deno and Eberts (1989) US Metropolitan Areas 0.08 
Eberts (1986, 1990) US Metropolitan Areas 0.03 
Source: Table adopted from Munnell (1992, p194),  
 
Munnell (1992) concludes that the evidence suggests that, in addition to providing an immediate 
demand-side economic stimulus, public infrastructure investment has a significant, positive 
5 
 
effect on output and growth. However, she stresses that in a policy making context ‘Aggregate 
results cannot be used to guide actual investment spending. Only cost-benefit studies can 
determine which projects should be implemented’ (Munnell (1992: p196)). 
 
Gramlich (1994)’s influential paper also unpacks many of the arguments and assertions made by 
Aschauer (1989), along with the mass of academic literature which followed. Gramlich (1994) 
begins his paper by using the narrow public sector ownership definition as the stock of 
infrastructure capital – but highlights that a wider meaning could involve private infrastructure 
capital, human capital investment and research and development spending. This emphasises the 
importance of definition – what type of investment is being classified as infrastructure and what 
type is then being linked to economic growth. Gramlich (1994) notes that projects such as a new 
highway might provide a very high return, whereas maintenance of rural roads might provide 
low or even negative economic rates of return; in such areas, investment objectives may be 
primarily social rather than economic. He applies this by showing that only two-thirds of the 
capital stock analysed by Aschauer (1989) even purports to raising national output – and to 
varying degrees – making his claims about the major positive influence of infrastructure on 
economic growth less plausible. 
 
As research in the field progressed, disputes over the direction of causality between changes in 
productivity and investment in infrastructure became dominant. Evans and Karras (1994) 
analyzed infrastructure and productivity data for seven Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries between 1963 and 1988. The study found strong 
correlations between the two variables, but concluded that the direction of causality was the 
opposite of that reported by Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1992). That is, increased stocks of 
public capital were the result of increased productivity and economic growth, not the cause. In 
analysing the correlation between average GDP and government net capital stock, they 
concluded that “there is no evidence that government capital is highly productive” (Evans and 
Karras (1994: p278). Zegeye (2000) supports the Evans and Karras (1994) study, concluding that 
infrastructure is a normal good, where wealthy counties will tend to have more and poor counties 
less. Zegeye (2000)’s report found the output elasticity between public infrastructure and private 
investment was just 0.02. 
 
Several other authors have attempted to resolve the question of causality, refining their 
methodologies to ensure they capture the results of infrastructure investments, and not the results 
of economic growth. A 2000 OECD study by Demetriades and Mamuneas, and a 2003 study by 
Esfahani and Ramirez handled the causality issue by introducing a “time-lag” between variables 
for public infrastructure and productivity. In these studies, investments were compared with the 
productivity data several years afterwards, allowing time for the benefits of infrastructure 
investments to manifest themselves in the productivity data, and reducing the chance of 
misrepresentation of economic growth impacts as productivity impacts. Both studies using this 
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technique found that public infrastructure does have a measurable impact on increasing 
productivity and economic growth, although not of the magnitude reported by Aschauer (1989). 
 
Lau and Sin (1997) published an important econometric paper on public infrastructure and 
economic growth. This was subsequently referred to as being ‘the most sophisticated subsequent 
econometric studies’ by SACTRA (1999) and commended for taking the research some way to 
circumventing the ‘causality’ and ‘definition’ difficulties highlighted by Munnell (1992) and 
Gramlich (1994)amongst others. The authors estimate the elasticity of output with respect to 
public capital to be 0.11. Although this would imply a much lower marginal product of public 
investment than that indicated by Aschauer (1989)’s original paper, it still suggests that 
infrastructure investment has a significant impact on output.  
 
The South African literature on the impact of infrastructure investment on economic growth is 
still small and relatively recent. It has followed along a similar path to the trends observed for the 
international literature. A good account of the literature is available in Fourie (2006). Table 2 
summarises all the studies that we are aware of on the topic. 
 
Table 2: The impact of an increase in the stock of public capital on output in South Africa 
Author Infrastructure measure (on 
economic growth) 
Econometric 
technique 
Output elasticity 
Abedian and van 
Seventer (1995) 
Public authorities capital stock OLS 0.33 
Public sector capital stock OLS 0.17 
Development Bank 
of South Africa 
(1998) 
Public authorities capital stock OLS 0.25 
Cointegration 0.3 
Public sector capital stock OLS 0.15 
Cointegration 0.28 
Public sector infrastructure stock OLS 0.17 
Cointegration 0.25 
Fedderke, Perkins 
and Luiz (2005) 
Electricity Generation VECM 0.1-0.2 and rising to 0.5 after 
controlling for institutions 
Bogetic and 
Fedderke (2005) 
Infrastructure measures on labour 
productivity 
VECM  0.2-0.4  
Infrastructure measures on total 
factor productivity 
VECM -0.6 
Fourie (2006) Electricity Generation VECM 0.2 
Electricity Generation on a measure 
of equity performance 
VECM 0.38 
Social Infrastructure VAR 0.01-0.02 
Source: Table adopted from Fourie (2006) and extended by authors. 
 
The early studies have relied on classical econometric tools while the latter studies have used 
more recent techniques of Vector Error Correction Models (VECMs) and Vector 
Autoregressions (VARs). In spite of differences in methodology, the studies report a positive 
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output elasticity. Bogetic and Fedderke (2005) find positive effects of infrastructure on labour 
productivity but negative effects on total factor productivity. Their explanation for this 
counterintuitive result is that infrastructure only has direct effects and no indirect effects! This is 
grossly at odds with predictions from received theory where indirect effects are most important. 
In follow up work, Fedderke and Bogetic (2006) concluded that infrastructure investment had a 
positive impact on productivity: total factor productivity increased by 0.04% when investment in 
economic infrastructure increased by 1%. However, Fedderke and Garlick (2008) suggested that 
the AsgiSA infrastructure plan might have had unfavourable effects in South Africa. Fourie 
(2006) finds bi-directional causality between infrastructure and growth and also finds large 
positive returns to infrastructure on equity. Thus, the South African econometric studies show 
favourable effects of infrastructure spending on growth, irrespective of the methodology used. 
Some even go further to argue that infrastructure on equity has higher returns than economic 
infrastructure7.  
 
Compared to the econometrics literature, the literature on CGE applications of public capital 
expenditures and links to economic growth is more recent and still growing. Similar to the 
econometrics literature just reviewed, the findings of this literature are mixed. Whilst most find 
that the output elasticity of public expenditure is positive, the magnitudes of the effects vary 
considerably. In a summary of some of the main studies on infrastructure, Kirsten and Davies 
(2008) show that, in general, studies that looked at various infrastructure sectors (roads, 
sanitation, electrification and dams) display varied results – some are beneficial for poverty 
reduction, others actually cause poverty. Using a static CGE model, Perrault et al. (2010) explore 
the impact of scaling up infrastructure in six African countries with different economic 
structures. They find that the different economic structures lead to differences in impact of 
investment funded by the same sources with the same model. The analysis shows the importance 
of the underlying economic structure in determining the impact of infrastructure expenditure in a 
country. This suggests that the structure of the economy where these policies will be applied 
needs to be taken into account. 
 
Another strand of related literature concerns itself with the effects of scaling up aid to developing 
countries. Received wisdom based on standard analysis came to the conclusion that scaling up 
aid flows would generate sustained growth and improved standard of living (Adam (2005)). This 
view has been challenged by authors who point out that both intended and unintended 
consequences discussed largely under the rubric of what has come to be referred to as 
                                                 
7Ayogu (2005) also surveys the theoretical literature on infrastructure and growth and then reviews the empirical 
evidence globally and within the African region. Overall he concludes that the question is not whether infrastructure 
matters but precisely how much it matters in different contexts? Ultimately, this is an empirical question that the 
literature has not yet resolved satisfactorily. In contrast, according to him, the crucial issue—understanding 
policymaking processes in infrastructure—remains little understood and largely under-researched. 
8 
 
‘absorptive capacity constraints’(see for example Burnside and Dollar (2004); Clemens and 
Redelet (2003); Heller (2005);Allen (2005)) make the impact of aid on economic growth 
indeterminate. A major concern in this respect is the so-called Dutch disease effect associated 
with scaling up foreign aid8. Recent evidence (including Adam and Bevan (2003); Allen (2005); 
Heller (2005); Bourguignon and Sundberg (2006)) has shown that the conventional Dutch 
disease effects may be overturned if there are productivity spillovers in both tradable and non-
tradable sectors. Using Uganda as an example, Adam and Bevan (2006) construct an aggregated 
CGE model and demonstrate that Dutch disease type effects can be avoided if the non-tradable 
sectors benefit from infrastructure investment externalities. Savard (2010) extends this kind of 
reasoning in three ways, namely, dropping the tradable-nontradables dichotomy, allowing for a 
wider variety of funding options for infrastructure spending and introducing a top-down bottom 
up microsimulation module to allow for poverty analysis. Applying the methodology to explore 
the impact of scaling up infrastructure in the Philippines, Savard (2010) finds that the macro 
results obtained from the analysis are similar to Adam and Bevan (2006) and Estache (2008), 
although the Dutch disease effects disappear when they assume the presence of production 
externalities. There are also no major differences at the macro level when taking into account 
funding options to scale-up infrastructure. However, poverty analysis shows stark differences 
and in particular the VAT funding option yields the most favourable outcomes in terms of 
poverty reduction when compared to the foreign aid option and the income tax option. To 
improve the analysis on this front, Savard (2010) suggests that a sequentially dynamic 
framework would be a more appropriate tool.  
 
A number of recent studies have sought to make contributions along this line. For instance, Jung 
and Thorbecke (2003) use a recursive dynamic CGE framework and showed that infrastructure 
spending benefited poor people in Tanzania but worsened the plight of the poor in Zambia. A 
fair amount of authors investigating the impacts or challenges of scaling up aid to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (see for example Bourguignon and Sundberg (2006), 
Hailu (2007) and Serieuxet al.(2008)) have also used this recursive dynamic approach. The 
model that is typically used in these exercises is referred to as the MAMS model (for details on 
the MAMS model, see Lofgren and Diaz-Bonilla (2005)). This model extends static standard 
CGE models of the type discussed above in two key respects. First is the incorporation of 
recursive dynamics and second is the addition of an MDG module that endogenizes MDG 
outcomes. The paper by Bourguinon and Sundberg (2006) based on the MAMS model calibrated 
to Ethiopian data concludes among other things, that the impact of large aid inflows on the Dutch 
disease can be serious but strategic investments to boost productivity and address trade 
constraints are important in addressing the adverse effects. World Bank (2005) report a similar 
finding for Ethiopia based on a model that focused on aid-financed investments in human capital. 
                                                 
8The term Dutch disease refers to a phenomenon where an economic boom (normally a discovery of natural 
resource or large inflow of foreign currency) leads to a real exchange rate appreciation that results in increased 
demand for non-tradables and eventually to a decline in the economic growth rate. It was coined to describe the de-
industrialisation experienced in the Netherlands in the 1960s following the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea. 
9 
 
Mabugu et al (2013) use an intertemporal CGE model to investigate the consequences of an 
expansive fiscal policy designed to accelerate economic growth in South Africa. The model is 
oriented towards constraints government faces in financing its expenditures and explains why it 
takes into account the different sources of income of the South African government, its 
expenditures and its deficit as well as intertemporal dynamics. The labour market faces a lot of 
rigidities in South Africa that the intertemporal model does not capture.  
 
Our paper is fundamentally similar in spirit and conception to these CGE-based simulation 
models just described but applied to reflect the structural features of the current South African 
economy. Presumably, the extent to which productivity spillovers from infrastructure 
investments can potentially affect the economy will depend on the particular circumstances of 
the country. In this respect we draw from the extensive infrastructure productivity econometrics 
literature discussed to postulate positive productive externalities associated with new 
infrastructure for South Africa. Unlike Mabugu et al (2013), labour market peculiarities of the 
South African economy have been included in our modelling and dynamics are modelled as 
recursive rather than intertemporal. This paper is intended to contribute to the discussion by 
providing evidence from South Africa using the economy-wide dynamic CGE model calibrated 
to contemporary conditions in the country. 
 
3 Data and Methodology9 
The original Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) used is from Quantec for 2005. The different 
occupations in the SAM are identified as skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled. For the purpose of 
this paper, the labour factor is disaggregated further into occupations. Integrated economic 
accounts from Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) for 2005, where the labour force is split 
according to occupation and population groups, are used after ensuring concordance with the 
SAM economic activities codes (Table 3) 
 
Table 3: Correspondence between occupations and skills level 
 
Skill Category Occupation 
Skilled 
Legislators (LEG) 
Professionals(PRO) 
Technicians(TECH) 
Semi skilled 
Clerks(CLER) 
Service workers(SEWO) 
Skilled agricultural workers(SKAG) 
Craft workers(CRAF) 
Plant and machine operators(PLAN) 
                                                 
9 The list of equations is available upon request from the authors. 
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Unskilled 
Elementary occupations(ELEM) 
Domestic workers(DOM) 
Occupation unspecified(ONS) 
 
The following table gives a repartition of the 11 different occupations by activity. 
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Table 4: Repartition of the labour force according to occupations and activities: 
 
  LEG PRO TECH CLER SEWO SKAG CRAF PLAN ELEM DOM ONS TOTAL 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 0,09 0,03 0,02 0,05 0,03 0,23 0,07 0,07 0,21 0,10 0,11 1 
Coal mining 0,09 0,11 0,05 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,14 0,08 0,13 0,04 0,33 1 
Gold & uranium ore mining 0,15 0,10 0,09 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,10 0,06 0,15 0,06 0,27 1 
Other mining 0,11 0,12 0,05 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,10 0,08 0,17 0,03 0,31 1 
Food 0,18 0,07 0,05 0,05 0,07 0,05 0,07 0,08 0,14 0,04 0,19 1 
Textiles 0,11 0,04 0,05 0,06 0,03 0,01 0,15 0,14 0,08 0,06 0,26 1 
Footwear 0,05 0,01 0,08 0,04 0,06 0,00 0,21 0,10 0,19 0,14 0,12 1 
Coke & refined petroleum products 0,19 0,11 0,07 0,07 0,05 0,01 0,08 0,10 0,09 0,05 0,19 1 
Non-metallic minerals 0,17 0,07 0,04 0,03 0,02 0,00 0,16 0,05 0,09 0,06 0,32 1 
Basic iron &steel and non-ferrous metals 0,16 0,09 0,09 0,06 0,04 0,00 0,17 0,08 0,07 0,04 0,19 1 
Machinery & equipment 0,16 0,11 0,05 0,09 0,05 0,01 0,15 0,06 0,09 0,02 0,21 1 
Radio and telecommunication 0,13 0,15 0,11 0,09 0,06 0,01 0,18 0,07 0,06 0,02 0,13 1 
Transport equipment 0,22 0,06 0,08 0,06 0,08 0,00 0,11 0,11 0,10 0,03 0,14 1 
Other manufactories 0,16 0,09 0,07 0,08 0,04 0,01 0,17 0,07 0,06 0,03 0,23 1 
Electricity, gas & steam 0,18 0,10 0,14 0,04 0,02 0,00 0,17 0,06 0,03 0,02 0,24 1 
Water supply 0,19 0,07 0,11 0,05 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,09 0,14 0,04 0,21 1 
Building construction 0,14 0,07 0,04 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,10 0,01 0,35 0,04 0,23 1 
Wholesale & retail trade 0,20 0,07 0,07 0,14 0,10 0,01 0,13 0,04 0,10 0,02 0,12 1 
12 
 
Catering & accommodation services 0,23 0,04 0,05 0,10 0,25 0,01 0,04 0,03 0,09 0,03 0,12 1 
Transports services 0,08 0,03 0,03 0,11 0,07 0,00 0,07 0,23 0,09 0,04 0,25 1 
Communication 0,23 0,12 0,09 0,19 0,07 0,01 0,04 0,06 0,04 0,01 0,14 1 
Finance and insurance 0,27 0,20 0,11 0,25 0,05 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,09 1 
Business services 0,18 0,26 0,08 0,09 0,15 0,01 0,05 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,11 1 
Other services 0,04 0,09 0,02 0,06 0,06 0,01 0,05 0,03 0,02 0,08 0,53 1 
Public services 0,17 0,12 0,06 0,15 0,33 0,01 0,04 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,05 1 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the SAM 
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From Table 4, we can point out that the construction sector is likely to be disproportionately 
affected by an infrastructure investment program policy because the sector is quite intensive in 
low skilled workers, especially the ones identified as elementary or unspecified occupations. 
Moreover, legislators (LEG) represent 15% of the labour force in this particular sector. 
 
For modelling, Gibson (2003) is used for the trade parameters and low-bound export supply, 
while demand elasticities are obtained from Behar and Edwards (2004). Estimates for parameters 
in industry production and household demand are not available for South Africa. Therefore, the 
study borrows these values from the literature surveyed by Annabi et al. (2006). Finally, 
unemployment rates are drawn from the labour force survey report by StatsSA (2009). 
 
To evaluate the impacts of government’s policies in the long run, the dynamic Poverty and 
Economic Policy (PEP 1-t) standard model by Decaluwé et al. (2010) is used. However, several 
assumptions of this standard model are changed in order to take into account the South African 
economy. The model has two production factors: capital and labour. Labour is disaggregated into 
three broad types: unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers. Each type of broad labour is then 
disaggregated into occupations. Each activity uses both production factors. 
 
In line with the SAM, the model has 25 activities and 54 commodities. The production function 
technology is assumed to be of constant returns to scale and is presented in a four-level 
production process. At the first level, output is a Leontief input-output of value added and 
intermediate consumption. At the second level, a CES function is used to represent the 
substitution between a composite labour and capital. At the third level, composite labour demand 
is also a CES function between skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labour. Then, the skilled 
demand is a CES with a low elasticity between legislators, professionals and technicians, 
capturing the fact that (for instance) it is quite difficult for the firms to substitute a lawyer for a 
doctor. The semi-skilled demand is a CES with an intermediate value of elasticity between its 
five components, while the unskilled demand is a CES with a high substitution value, assuming 
that the producer can relatively easily substitute low skilled workers among them. Figure 1 gives 
the value-added structure. 
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Figure 1: The value-added structure 
 
 
South Africa has high unemployment problems, notably for semi-skilled and unskilled labour. 
Moreover, unions are very strong in the country. The trade union movement is the most 
disciplined and the largest in Africa and has influenced labour and other related industrial 
policies. Unions negotiate salaries and wages, conditions of service, workforce restructuring and 
retrenchments on behalf of their members. As a result, wages and salaries are rigid, which the 
model takes into account by assuming a binding minimum wage for each type of worker. Thus, if 
the production decreases, producers will not be able to decrease their employees’ salary below 
the minimum wage. This rigidity will also have an impact on unemployment, as if producers 
cannot decrease the wage bill, they will have to retrench some workers. 
 
 
Following the literature review in the previous section, we introduce a productivity factor to 
investment in infrastructure. As mentioned, the value added for each sector is a CES composite 
of labour and capital. We add a productivity factor related to the stock of infrastructure in the 
country to the function. 
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Semi-skilled 
workers 
Clerks 
Service 
workers   
Skilled 
agricultural 
Craft workers   
Plant and machine 
operators   
Unskilled 
labour 
Elementary 
occupations 
Domestic 
workers Unspecified 
Capital 
15 
 
 
Where: 
:,tjVA  Value added of sector j 
:INFtKD  Infrastructure stock 
:,tjLDC  Sector j aggregate labour demand 
:,tjKDC  Demand for composite capital by sector j 
:VAjB  Scale parameter (CES – value added) 
:VAjβ  Distributive parameter (CES – value added) 
:VAjρ  Elasticity parameter (CES – value added)  
:INFjσ  Elasticity – productivity and infrastructure 
 
Modelled in this way, investment in infrastructure will increase the stock of infrastructure capital 
(𝐾𝐷𝑡𝐼𝑁𝐹), in the following year. If no investment is made, then the stock of infrastructure capital 
remains the same and there is no extra increase in value added of a given sector. The value of 
elasticity 𝜎𝑗𝐼𝑁𝐹 is obtained from the existing literature. 
 
As closure rules, we choose the nominal exchange rate as the numeraire in the model.10 
Following the assumption that South Africa is a small country, world prices are fixed. However, 
also assumed is the fact that South African exporters face less than infinite foreign demand for 
exports: to increase their market share on the world market, they need to reduce their free-on-
board (FOB)export prices, increasing their competiveness with respect to other suppliers on the 
international market. Factor supplies are fixed in the first period and then grow, at the population 
rate for labour force and using an accumulation equation for capital.11 Transfers between 
institutions and government’s purchases of commodities are fixed at the base year and then grow 
at the population rate. The assumption is that the rest of the world’s savings is a fixed proportion 
of GDP, which means that South Africa is not allowed to borrow further from the rest of the 
world.12 
 
4 Policy Simulations and Results 
. 
This paper analyses the impact of an increase in public investment, following the South African 
investment plan presented in the table below for the period 2012 up to 2016, and thereafter at the 
population rate. The simulated investment programme is split into three components (a) 
                                                 
10Note that in the CGE results, a real devaluation of the rand takes the form of a generalised reduction in domestic 
prices. 
11 To specify the accumulation of capital, the Jung and Thorbecke (2003) function is followed. 
12 This assumption can seem strange given that the country has in the past increased their savings from abroad. 
However, South Africa does not want to increase substantially its current level of borrowing. 
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investment in government sectors (e.g. education, justice) that increase the stock of capital of 
public sectors, (b) investment in infrastructure (e.g. roads, harbours, airports) that does not 
increase the stock of capital of any sectors in particular and can be considered a public good and 
(c) investment in productive sectors (e.g. investment in the energy sector) that increase the 
capital stock of a given sector. Based on the literature reviewed, the simulations thus take into 
account the effect of infrastructure productivity on the other sectors. Assuming productivity 
effect of infrastructure investment on other sectors means, for instance, that the construction of a 
bridge (investment in infrastructure) will have an impact on other sectors if the use of this bridge 
reduces travel time) or government investment in building a road (infrastructure spending), or in 
constructing/renovating a harbour, has impacts on other sectors: their transport margins will 
decrease and they will be able to trade more, using the same quantities of labour and capital. 
Government investment can also increase private capital stock, for instance when government 
invests in a nuclear plant, it increases the stock of capital of the electricity/energy sector. 
 
 
Table 5: South African investment plan: 
  
Nov.-2010 Dec-2011 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
Economic services 161,9 197,3 217,8 228,2 230,1 
Energy 52,5 71,7 90,4 98,8 102,7 
Water and sanitation 14,4 17,8 20,6 19,9 19,8 
Transport and logistics 69,1 79,5 76,3 76,9 72,3 
Other economic services 25,8 28,4 30,4 32,5 35,2 
Social services 17,2 26,6 26,8 32,5 35,2 
Health 6,7 10 9,6 13,9 15,2 
Education 6 9,1 9,8 11,2 11,2 
Community facilities 3,5 5,2 4,7 4,8 6,2 
Other social services 1 2,4 2,6 2,6 2,7 
Justice and protection 3,8 4,1 4,4 5,1 5,8 services  Central government and 2,1 4,2 8 3,5 2,5 
Financial services 0,3 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,8 
Total 185,3 232,9 257,6 269,9 274,4 
Source: Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (2011), page 26 table 3.2 
 
Four different ways of financing these policies are proposed. First, government totally finances 
the increase (i.e. government’s savings are endogenous and, given the policy set up, might 
decrease). Then, in the next three finance options, government’s deficit is kept constant, and the 
increased spending is financed through increasing direct taxes on households, increasing firms’ 
direct taxes, and increasing indirect taxes. 
. 
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1- Deficit financed investment policy 
The results of an increase in government’s public investment on unemployment are shown in 
Table 6. The policy has a very positive impact on unemployment for all the different types of 
workers both in the short run (2012) and long run (2020).  Government’s activities are more 
intensive in skilled and semi-skilled workers, and so the impact is greater for these two types of 
workers. For skilled workers, unemployment disappears in 2015 and for all categories, positive 
impacts remain after the simulations years. 
 
 
Table 6 : Impact on unemployment (% to Business as Usual (BAU)) 
  LEG PRO TECH SEWO SKAG CRAF PLAN CLER 
ELE
M DOM ONS 
2012 -13,93 -0,06 -5,06 -0,92 -1,72 -1,35 -1,27 -0,51 -1,88 -0,85 -0,74 
2020       -14,31 -25,64 -11,89 -15,46 
-
12,83 
-
15,08 -8,74 -7,07 
 
Table 7 presents the impacts on production for each sector of the economy. In the short run, most 
of the sectors increase their production, but in the long run quite a number of them experience a 
decrease. The reason why impacts on production are quite positive for most of the sectors is 
because these activities do not suffer total crowding out effect as some public investment is 
directly improving their production (as the electricity sector) and all the sectors benefit from a 
decrease in margins costs, due to the improvement of infrastructure in the economy. The increase 
in government spending also has an impact on the other sectors through an increase of 
intermediate demand. To produce more, government sectors need extra public servants, 
buildings, and all types of commodities produced by the other sectors. With the decrease of 
unemployment, workers also receive an increase in wages. Indeed, as government’s activities 
need more workers to produce, they will attract skilled and semi-skilled workers mainly by 
offering a better wage than the other activities. Thus, to keep their workers, the other activities 
will also have to increase the wages they pay to their workers, which results in increased 
production costs. Sectors with a similar labour demand structure will find it more costly to 
produce and this explains why their production levels decline. The decline is also due to a drop 
in total investment induced by government crowd out. 
 
 
Table 7 : Impact on Production (% to BAU) 
Sectors 2012 2020 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 0,10 0,03 
Coal mining 0,02 -0,42 
Gold & uranium ore mining 0,37 4,23 
Other mining 0,05 -1,76 
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Food 0,09 0,23 
Textiles 0,18 0,92 
Footwear 0,14 0,60 
Coke & refined petroleum products 0,12 0,25 
Non-metallic minerals 0,94 5,26 
Basic iron &steel and non-ferrous metals -0,58 -5,75 
Machinery & equipment -2,13 -17,06 
Radio and telecommunication 0,78 4,60 
Transport equipment 0,68 4,23 
Other manufactories 0,81 5,09 
Electricity, gas & steam 0,16 2,94 
Water supply 0,09 0,42 
Building construction 1,86 10,81 
Wholesale & retail trade 0,07 -0,18 
Catering & accommodation services 0,11 -0,14 
Transports services 0,07 -0,07 
Communication 0,07 -0,18 
Finance and insurance -0,20 -1,44 
Business services -0,42 -4,41 
Other services 0,15 1,40 
Public services 0,53 8,45 
 
The impacts on agents are quite interesting as they differ. Households benefit from this policy 
because of the decrease in unemployment and the increase in wages raise household income 
(Table 8). Note that although their transfer income from firms (dividends) decreases, overall 
household income increases in the long run by almost 1%. Household savings and consumption 
also increase, as they are fixed proportions of disposable income. 
 
Table 8 : Impact on households’ income (in % to BAU) 
 
  Labor income Transfer income Total income 
2012 0,20 -0,17 0,06 
2020 3,49 -3,26 0,91 
 
Firms are suffering but less than in the case had investment in infrastructure been assumed to 
have no productivity effect. The negative impact on firms is less in the short compared to the 
long run. Capital income decreases, and so do firms’ income and savings, because of the drop in 
total investment (Table 9). 
 
 
19 
 
Table 9 : Impact on firms’ income and savings (in % to BAU) 
  YFK YF SF 
2012 -0.25 -0.22 -0.21 
2020 -4.64 -4.09 -4.00 
 
Table 10 presents all the sources of government’s income and how they react to the increase in 
government spending. The first component represents transfer income and comes mainly from 
firms (dividends). The second one represents all the taxes on production (on labour, capital, 
production). The third one is the sum of all taxes on products (import taxes, VAT, export taxes, 
excise taxes, fuel levy). The final one is total direct taxes paid by households and firms. 
Government income is slightly decreasing in the long run, due to the decrease in transfers 
government receives from firms and the receipts from firms’ direct taxes.  
 
Table 10 : Impact on government (in % to BAU) 
 
  Transfers income 
Taxes on 
production 
Taxes on 
products 
Direct 
taxes on 
households 
Direct 
taxes on 
firms 
Total 
government 
income 
2012 -0,21 -0,24 0,12 0,06 -0,25 -0,01 
2020 -4,00 -1,26 0,86 0,91 -4,64 -0,63 
 
Not surprisingly, we observe a drop in government’s savings as there is no tax policy adjustment 
to finance the investment program. The drop in government savings, followed by the drop in 
firms’ savings, leads to a decrease in total investment. While a crowding-out effect of investment 
is evident, the impact on private investment is less harmful because a part of government 
investment is productive. The impact on GDP is hardly perceptible as shown in Figure 2. With 
this type of policy, the idea is to see what happens in the long run. It is known that in the short 
run, government deficit increases a lot, but in the long run, the pressing policy issue is ‘can this 
spending create a greater economic activity in order to generate new revenue’? For instance, a 
policy that creates jobs will have an impact on the fiscal side, as new workers will get income 
and pay new taxes (direct and indirect). The next set of simulations address this issue. 
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Figure 2 : Impact on GDP 
 
 
 
2- Tax financed investment policy 
The first simulation has very positive results on unemployment and benefits to households. 
However, in the long term, the drop in total investment tends to reduce economic growth. 
Moreover, it is not sustainable for South Africa to let its deficit grow unabated. Therefore, the 
same simulation is presented, but the closure of the model is changed: government’s savings are 
kept fixed, and an endogenous tax finances the policy. In Simulation FinA, the direct tax rate of 
households adjusts. In Simulation FinB, the direct tax rate on firms adjusts, and in Simulation 
FinC, the indirect tax rate adjusts. The results of these three simulations are presented together.  
 
In terms of unemployment, as shown in the following tables, the results differ according to the 
scenario. FinB scenario seems to be the less harmful across all categories of workers. Note that 
for skilled workers, as the values of unemployment were low at the base year, the percentage 
change look dramatic. Note though that results are still very negative under Simulation FinC. 
Indeed, under this scenario, both agents and activities are hit by the increase in commodity tax 
rate.  
 
Table 11 : Impact on unemployment for skilled workers (% to BAU) 
 
  LEG PRO TECH 
  2012 2020 2012 2020 2012 2020 
FinA 42,75 50,39 67,29 171,88 37,11 73,07 
FinB 17,09   36,75 -32,04 18,05 -34,51 
FinC 156,38 877,84 185,02 1076,57 119,78 606,59 
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Table 12 : Impact on unemployment for semi-skilled workers (% to BAU) 
 
  CLER SEWO SKAG CRAF PLAN 
  2012 2020 2012 2020 2012 2020 2012 2020 2012 2020 
FinA 4,46 13,99 1,49 -4,79 7,73 38,36 0,37 -8,44 2,82 6,33 
FinB 2,21 -0,81 0,40 -11,15 3,46 8,20 -0,40 -13,02 0,98 -6,14 
FinC 10,58 60,01 5,74 29,80 14,83 88,72 8,00 47,01 10,20 60,83 
 
 
Table 13 : Impact on unemployment for low skilled workers (% to BAU) 
 
  ELEM DOM ONS 
  2012 2020 2012 2020 2012 2020 
FinA -2,77 -24,10 1,40 3,00 1,71 5,26 
FinB -2,36 -21,81 0,39 -3,53 0,60 -1,61 
FinC 1,58 7,61 4,76 28,01 5,10 30,42 
 
The impact on the sectors depends on how heavily sectors rely on investment. Activities that face 
an increase in their input prices (in terms of intermediate consumption) will retrench workers, 
and reduce their production. The impact is not uniform across sectors. Indeed, some sectors are 
directly favoured by the investment policy, especially the construction sector. Moreover, some 
sectors do not directly benefit from the policy, but as they produce investment goods, their 
production will increase. Once again, results under FinC are very harmful for the economy. 
 
Table 14 : Impact on production (% to BAU) 
 
  FinA FinB FinC 
  2012 2020 2012 2020 2012 2020 
Agriculture, 
forestry & fishing -0,50 -1,20 -0,23 -0,43 -1,06 -6,00 
Coal mining 0,00 3,96 0,01 2,38 -0,82 -3,47 
Gold & uranium 
ore mining 0,55 10,05 0,47 8,46 -0,18 4,12 
Other mining 0,42 7,05 0,25 3,39 -0,19 0,97 
Food -0,94 -4,52 -0,48 -2,20 -1,44 -8,53 
Textiles -1,50 -6,84 -0,74 -2,97 -2,41 -14,41 
Footwear -1,32 -6,27 -0,66 -2,89 -2,21 -13,29 
Coke & refined -0,27 1,24 -0,09 1,12 -0,92 -4,60 
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petroleum 
products 
Non-metallic 
minerals 3,03 25,42 2,08 16,73 1,97 16,45 
Basic iron &steel 
and non-ferrous 
metals 
0,79 9,13 0,16 2,93 -0,38 -0,51 
Machinery & 
equipment 0,68 7,52 -0,60 -2,97 -0,65 -3,18 
Radio and 
telecommunication 0,78 9,18 0,78 7,63 -0,49 -1,23 
Transport 
equipment 0,80 9,06 0,74 7,33 -0,64 -2,51 
Other 
manufactories 0,58 8,00 0,68 7,06 -0,17 1,56 
Electricity, gas & 
steam -1,08 -2,92 -0,51 0,12 -1,64 -8,62 
Water supply -0,99 -3,43 -0,50 -1,35 -1,52 -8,47 
Building 
construction 5,87 43,49 4,05 29,36 4,40 32,09 
Wholesale & retail 
trade -0,23 1,34 -0,09 0,99 -0,91 -4,55 
Catering & 
accommodation 
services 
-1,34 -6,01 -0,68 -2,94 -2,11 -12,53 
Transports 
services -0,21 1,27 -0,08 0,93 -0,77 -3,77 
Communication -0,92 -3,24 -0,47 -1,48 -1,48 -8,63 
Finance and 
insurance -0,98 -3,13 -0,63 -1,74 -1,76 -9,49 
Business services -0,52 -0,77 -0,48 -2,15 -1,06 -6,25 
Other services -1,57 -7,57 -0,79 -3,31 -1,97 -11,32 
Public services 0,57 10,32 0,55 9,89 0,28 6,87 
 
The impact on households is negative because the drop in transfers they receive from firms, and 
the decrease in labour income they receive (Table 15). Note that in the long run household 
income falls the least under FinA, that is, when direct tax rate adjusts. 
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Table 15 : Impact on households’ income (% to BAU) 
 
  Labour income Transfer income Total income 
  2012 2020 2012 2020 2012 2020 
FinA -0,42 -0,34 -0,42 -3,31 -0,42 -1,47 
FinB -0,14 1,45 -3,21 -23,21 -1,31 -7,96 
FinC -1,59 -9,11 -1,01 -8,09 -1,37 -8,72 
 
The impact on firms is also negative, notably under Simulation FinB, as they face an increase in 
the direct taxes they pay. Here, firms’ savings drop by almost 30% in the long run, which will 
have a massive impact on private investment. In the three scenarios, government income 
increases due to the fiscal mechanism set up. Private investment decreases and is worse when 
firms have to finance the policy. This is because firms contribute significantly to private 
investment. Overall, total investment increases for each scenario. As public investment increases 
due to the policy, total investment also increases. The increase is less significant under FinB 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 : Impact on total investment 
 
 
 
Finally, from Figure 4 it can be observed that the policy is less harmful to GDP when financed 
by firms. Indeed, when households finance the policy, the impact on consumption and thus on 
GDP is too big. Needless to say, in Simulation FinC, the results are very bad. Financing the 
policy through an increase in indirect tax penalises the entire economy. 
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Figure 4 : Impact on GDP (at basic prices) 
 
 
 
5 Concluding remarks and policy discussion 
This paper has analysed the investment policy the South African government plans to set up 
under four different fiscal scenarios. The way this investment plan has been treated in our 
modelling allows the government to intervene in public and private sectors of the economy. The 
benefits of infrastructure investment are taken into account through a productivity mechanism 
that will enhance other sectors. Particular attention has been paid to the labour market in the 
modelling. 
 
Besides improving the quality of infrastructure, the government wishes to reduce unemployment 
that is endemic in the country. In terms of employment, the results are quite disappointing: 
indeed, except under the first scenario, this investment plan is not able to generate enough 
activity in the economy to reduce unemployment. If we consider a long term fiscal sustainability, 
VAT financing of the investment plan is pretty harsh on the economy, as it affects all the agents 
in the economy. Moreover, this fiscal policy would not be ‘pro-poor’ because all households 
(including the poor) are hit by an increase in VAT. The alternative financing scenario would 
offer some political options to the government, as it will target only households that pay direct 
taxes or firms. An intermediate solution could this incorporate a combined burden sharing 
between households and firms. 
.  
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